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ROBERT PITOFSKY:
PUBLIC SERVANT AND SCHOLAR
Timothy J. Muris'
INTRODUCTION
Robert Pitofsky is one of the key Founding Fathers of the mod-
em Federal Trade Commission ("FTC"). He was present at its crea-
tion, as principal author of the 1969 ABA Report on the Commis-
sion. 1 In that pivotal role, he crafted a vision for a revitalized agency
that remains as relevant today as it was 30 years ago. The core of that
vision is the recognition that consumer welfare is the agency's reason
for being. Even more remarkably, over the next three decades, Bob,
in his role as Director of the Bureau of Consumer Protection, Com-
missioner, and Chairman as well as scholar, worked to make that vi-
sion a reality. In that period of time, others have interpreted Bob's
original vision in different ways, but it was altogether fitting that the
composer himself return to show how the music should be played.
Bob and I are of like mind, but have not always agreed. Agree-
ment, however, is not the best basis to evaluate a scholar or a Chair-
man. A more objective measure is whether he had a coherent, princi-
pled vision for the agency and was able to implement it. By this
measure, Bob has been a resounding success. Today's Federal Trade
Commission is the agency that Pitofsky and his ABA colleagues en-
visioned some 30 years ago, and he can take enormous credit for this
accomplishment.
I. ABA REPORT: BLUEPRINT FOR THE FUTURE
Pitofsky's role in FTC history began in 1969 when he was Coun-
sel to the ABA Commission to Study the FTC. The FTC then was at
the most critical juncture of its history. The Nader Report had just
t Chairman, Federal Trade Commission. I wish to thank Teresa Schwartz, William
Kovacic, Lee Peeler, and Lesley Fair for their assistance. The views expressed in this article are
my own and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Commission or other Commissioners.
1 COMM'N TO STUDY THE FED. TRADE COMM'N, ABA, REPORT OF THE ABA CoMMIs-
SION TO STUDY THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION (1969) [hereinafter ABA REPORT].
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been issued, lambasting the agency and characterizing its overall per-
formance as "shockingly poor.",2 The ABA also found serious weak-
nesses throughout the FTC-poor leadership, lack of direction, aim-
less enforcement, and squandered resources. The fundamental ques-
tion was whether the agency should be abolished or reformed.
The ABA Commission chose reform, but with a significant ca-
veat: if the agency did not change fundamentally, and soon, it should
be abolished. "Further temporizing is indefensible. Notwithstanding
the great potential for the FTC in the field of antitrust and consumer
protection, if change does not occur there will be no substantial pur-
pose to be served by its continued existence .... 3
The ABA Report did much more than find fault; it offered solutions.
It provided a blueprint for reform for both consumer protection and
antitrust. For consumer protection, the Report prescribed vigorous
law enforcement and a national role in developing consumer protec-
tion policy. More specifically, it recommended that the agency focus
enforcement on serious consumer problems, especially fraud. The
recommendations included:
Mount a more effective campaign against deceptive advertising;
Strengthen its remedies and reduce delays;
Provide industry guidance and incentives for compliance and self-
regulation;
Undertake studies, issue reports, and make legislative recommenda-
tions directed at pressing consumer issues;
Work with state and local consumer protection agencies; and
Make consumer education part of the agency's mission.4
For competition, the Report prescribed that the Commission use
its unique history and institutional advantages-those not available to
the Department of Justice's Antitrust Division-to advance competi-
tion policy and enforcement. More specifically, the Report recom-
mended that the agency:
Use the "full panoply" of its institutional tools to make competition
policy-doing research, publishing studies, bringing cases, and mak-
ing use of the intersection of competition policy and consumer protec-
tion authority;
2 See EDWARD F. COX ET AL., THE CONSUMER AND THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION
137 (1969) (critiquing the FTC and providing suggestions for institutional reform).
3 ABA REPORT, supra note 1, at 3.4 See id. at 1-3.
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Formulate national competition policy by using the administrative
process to adjudicate cases; and
Make policy involving "unsettled" areas of the law. 5
II. FROM SCHOLAR TO PUBLIC SERVANT
Shortly after the ABA Report, Bob Pitofsky became Director of
the Bureau of Consumer Protection ("BCP"). Creating a blueprint for
fundamental change was one thing, implementing it another. From
my government career and my brief experience as a law school dean,
I know that making plans is relatively easy, but putting them into
practice is the ultimate measure of success. Yet, Bob Pitofsky proved
successful at both.
In three short years, with more than a little help from the staff,
6
he transformed the BCP. 7 He systematically addressed the deficien-
cies identified in the ABA Report. He formulated a plan to allocate
resources, and in direct response to the ABA Report's criticism that
too little attention had been given to the surge in national advertising,
made deception in national advertising a BCP priority.8 Characteris-
tically, one of the early actions of the new Bureau was to hold hear-
ings on Advertising and the Public Interest, which resulted in a report
and recommendations to the Commission. The Foreword to the re-
port, written by Bob Pitofsky, is telling: "It]hose who seek a sensa-
tionalized approach to serious and complicated problems of economic
regulation will be disappointed. This report is solid, business-like and
professional and, in my opinion, fair to the conflicting viewpoints that
inevitably emerge in discussion of problems of deception in advertis-
ing."
9
Bob launched an aggressive array of advertising investigations
involving food and drugs,10 health and safety issues,' energy and en-
5 See id. at 64-65.
6 Bob's long relationship with Jodie Bernstein, who became Chairman Pitofsky's Direc-
tor of the Bureau of Consumer Protection, began when Bob, as Bureau Director, made Bernstein
his assistant.
7 In mid-1970, in response to the criticism in the ABA Report, the Commission adopted
a major reorganization plan that, for the first time, consolidated all of the agency's consumer
protection responsibilities into one operating bureau, the Bureau of Consumer Protection. FED.
TRADE COMM'N, 1970 ANN. REP. 1.
8 See FED. TRADE COMvM'N, 1971 ANN. REP. 12. The Commission did so for three
reasons. The first reason was the sheer volume, immediacy, and impact of national television
advertising. Second, there were growing concerns about the claims being made in national
advertising. Finally, the Commission believed it necessary to address the rising public frustra-
tion with alleged unfair and deceptive practices of some national TV advertisers.
9 JoHN A. HOWARD & JAMES HULBERT, THE FED. TRADE COMM'N, ADVERTISING AND
THE PUBLIC INTEREsT: A STAFF REPORT TO THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION (1973).
10 See, e.g., Bristol-Myers Co., 102 F.T.C. 21 (1983) (final admin. order); Sterling Drug,
Inc., 102 F.T.C. 395 (1983) (final admin. order); American Home Products Corp., 98 F.T.C. 136
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vironmental claims, 12 and advertising directed to children. 13  Using
the FTC's persuasive power, rather than law enforcement, he also
convinced television networks to eliminate their ban on comparative
advertising.
14
One cornerstone of this new focus on national advertising was devel-
opment of the legal principle that advertisers needed a reasonable ba-
sis to support objective claims in advertising before the claims were
made.5 Although today the concept of ad substantiation is often
taken for granted,1 6 in the early 1970s, the rule that advertisers were
legally required to have adequate substantiation (or a reasonable ba-
sis) for objective claims before they are made was important and con-
troversial. Its adoption by the Commission provided the basis for
both the success of the flexible, case-based approach to advertising
regulation the Commission used and for increased self-regulation by
the advertising industry. Indeed, when faced with an increasingly
active FTC and a concerned public, the advertising industry re-
sponded by creating the National Advertising Review Board, or
NARB, in 1971. One of the first principles the NARB announced
was that advertisers must possess reasonable substantiation for their
objective claims. 17  The NARB today remains a model of self-
regulation, a vital supplement to government law enforcement efforts,
(1981) (final admin. order); Medi-Hair Int'l, 80 F.T.C. 627 (1972) (consent order); Ocean Spray
Cranberries, Inc., 80 F.T.C. 975 (1972) (consent order); Procter & Gamble Co., 80 F.T.C. 181
(1972) (consent order); General Foods Corp., 79 F.T.C. 422 (1971) (consent order).
11 See, e.g., Warner-Lambert Co., 86 F.T.C. 1398 (1975) (admin. order); Firestone Tire &
Rubber Co., 81 F.T.C. 398 (1972) (admin. order); Lorillard, 80 F.T.C. 455 (1972) (consent
orders).
12 See, e.g., Sun Oil Co., 84 F.T.C. 247 (1974) (consent order); Union Carbide Corp., 84
F.T.C. 591 (1974) (consent order); Ex-Cell-O Corp., 82 F.T.C. 36 (1973) (consent order).
13 See, e.g., Mattel, Inc., 79 F.T.C. 667 (1971) (consent order). Children's advertising was
also an important focus of the 1971 FTC hearings on Advertising and the Public Interest. See
HowARD & HULBERT, supra note 9, at 58.
14 See FED. TRADE COMM'N, CONSUMER INFORMATION REMEDIES: POLICY REVIEW
SESSION 221-233 (1979) (describing efforts initiated by Pitofsky to persuade the major televi-
sion networks to end voluntary bans on comparative advertising). See also 16 C.F.R. § 14.15
(2001) (codifying FTC's comparative advertising policy statement, adopted in August 1979).
15 See Pfizer, Inc., 81 F.T.C. 23 (1972) (admin. order). In 1970, the Commission issued a
complaint challenging as unsubstantiated claims that an over-the-counter sunburn remedy could
actually anesthetize nerves in sensitive sunburned skin. Although the Commission ultimately
dismissed the complaint, it unambiguously affirmed the principle that Section 5 requires com-
panies to have adequate substantiation for their advertising claims, noting "[the significance of
this particular case lies... not so much in the entry of a cease and desist order.., but in the
resolution of the general issue of whether the failure to possess a reasonable basis for affirma-
tive product claims [violates Section 5]." Id. at 73-74. Those words turned out to be prescient.
16 See, e.g., Thompson Medical Co., 104 F.T.C. 648 (1984) (final admin. order).
'7 See, e.g., Stanley E. Cohen, Who'll Demand Ad Proof Is Lively Question, But Someone
Clearly Will, ADVERTISING AGE, June 21, 1971, at 70 (discussing the need for advertising sub-
stantiation).
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and one of the many accomplishments for which Bob Pitofsky can
genuinely be proud.
Implementation of the substantiation doctrine, of course, has at
times been controversial. Part of its original intent-to place materi-
als on the record for the public to analyze-has long been abandoned.
The combination of a lack of a precise methodology for determining
the content of implied claims along with extraordinary substantiation
requirements became a major problem in advertising cases of the
mid- and late 1970s, after Pitofsky departed as Bureau Director. The
Commission's deception and substantiation statements of the 1980s'
8
-still followed today-helped place appropriate parameters on the
doctrine, including its grounding in the Commission's deception au-
thority. 9
In the end, the results of these Commission efforts, begun in the
early 1970s, were well-established "rules of the road" for national
advertising. What then seemed novel and controversial is now well
accepted and almost commonplace. And, as described in the next
section, each effort not only provided significant consumer protec-
tion, but was directed toward ensuring a better functioning market-
place.
III. CONTINUING ENGAGEMENT AS SCHOLAR
Before returning to the FTC in 1978 as Commissioner Pitofsky,
Professor Pitofsky wrote his ground-breaking 1977 article, Beyond
Nader: Consumer Protection and the Regulation of Advertising,
which supplied much of the intellectual framework for today's mar-
ket-oriented advertising program at the FTC.2° In Beyond Nader, he
wrote: "[p]rotection of consumers against advertising fraud should
not be a broad, theoretical effort to achieve Truth, but rather a practi-
cal enterprise to ensure the existence of reliable data which in turn
will facilitate an efficient and reliable competitive market process."'
'a See Letter from James C. Miller M Chairman F.T.C., to Hon. John D. Dingell, Chair-
man, Committee on Energy and Commerce (Oct. 14, 1983), reprinted in Cliffdale Associates,
Inc., 103 F.T.C. 110, 174 (1984) [hereinafter Deception Policy Statement] (clarifying the man-
ner in which the Commission planned on enforcing its deception mandate); FED. TRADE
CoMM'N, FrC PoLIcY STATEMENT REGARDING ADVERTISING SUBSTANTIATION, reprinted in
Thompson Medical Co., 104 F.T.C. 648, 839 (1984) [hereinafter Substantiation Policy State-
ment] (articulating the Commission's advertising substantiation policy).
'9 See Robert Pitofsky, Beyond Nader: Consumer Protection and the Regulation of Adver-
tising, 90 HARV. L REV. 661, 681-83 (1977) (asserting that costs of prior substantiation re-
quirement should be weighed against benefits to consumers; for example, "an across-the-board
substantiation requirement seems justified" for health and safety claims, but not so for claims
involving minor economic injury).20 Id.
21 Id. at671.
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When market failure disrupts the free flow of accurate information to
consumers, however, "government regulation of the advertising proc-
ess is warranted.,
22
Pitofsky's balanced, market-based approach to the regulation of
advertising is the foundation for many of today's well-settled princi-
ples of deception law, including the Commission's 1983 Deception
Policy Statement. In decrying the tendency of past Commissions to
become "entangled in nit-picking, literalistic disputes" motivated by
competitor complaints from entrenched rivals23-- not consumer inter-
ests-he focused the agency on cases involving injury to consumers.
He also paved the way for the principle that absent evidence that ads
targeted a particularly vulnerable group, the Commission should
evaluate claims from the point of view of "average" or "ordinary"
consumers.24 Further, while recognizing that courts had left issues of
ad interpretation to the Commission's expertise, his was among the
first voices to urge the FTC to exercise that expertise with prudence72
That he himself exercised great care in interpreting ad claims is a
point no staff member who has ever presented an advertising case to
Bob Pitofsky would dispute.
Pitofsky's 1977 article also argued that there were some types of
deception cases that the Commission should avoid either because of
their detrimental effect on vigorous competition or because they in-
volved cheap, safe products with which consumers were familiar.
"[W]here consumers are fully capable, through common sense or
simple observation, of protecting their interests against advertising
exaggerations or distortions, there would be no reason for the law to
intervene., 26 Particularly noteworthy was Bob's critique of the FTC's
deceptive pricing cases. 27 Here, his antitrust and consumer protection
analysis united. He noted that the agency's focus on the literal truth
of the pricing claims without regard to any reasonable interpretation
of the ads resulted in law enforcement that was both anticompetitive
and anti-consumer, i.e., cases that discouraged discounting. De-
emphasis of such cases was a major triumph of his vision.
Without his intellectual framework, advertising regulation could
have taken a distinctly different turn from the balanced approach of
22 Id. at 669.
23 Id. at 674.
24 Deccption Policy Statement, supra note 18, at 177-78 (applying a "reasonable con-
sumer test" in determining liability for deceptive advertising). Beyond Nader noted the "aston-
ishing lengths" that the Commission had gone to protect the credulous from inconsequential
inaccuracies in advertising, efforts that diverted resources away from more important consumer
protection issues. See Pitofsky, supra note 19, at 676 n.58.
25 See Pitofsky, supra note 19, at 679.
26 Id. at 671.
27 See id. at 687-89.
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recent years. Both consumers and competition have benefited from
Pitofsky's championing of market-based solutions. It should be clear
that I have always regarded Robert Pitofsky's views as one of the in-
tellectual foundations of the FrC's 1983 Deception Policy Statement.
Unfortunately, during the controversy that surrounded that statement,
his role was, perhaps, under appreciated.
This praise of Bob's work in the 1970s is not meant to ignore
that by 1980, the FrC had gone seriously astray. The most important
problem on the consumer protection side, the rise of rulemaking de-
signed to make the FrC our nation's second most powerful legisla-
ture, followed Bob's tenure as BCP Director. When Bob returned, he
was instrumental in helping rein in the worst excesses, specifically the
FTC's virtually unlimited claims under its "unfairness" jurisdiction
following the Supreme Court's 1972 FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson
Co. decision.28  In fact, as a Commissioner in the late seventies, Bob
was one of the early voices calling for a more principled statement of
how the Commission would use its unfairness authority and an advo-
cate for the 1980 Unfairness Policy Statement.29 The principles de-
veloped in that statement themselves became the basis for legislative
codification of the Commission's unfairness authority in 1994, which
ended the long deadlock between the House and Senate over FTC
reauthorization.30 Cautious use of unfairness was a hallmark of the
Pitofsky Commission in the 1990s.
IV. FAST-FORWARD TO THE LAST SIX YEARS
As Chairman, building on his decades of experience, Pitofsky
engineered a full flowering of the FTC's consumer protection mis-
sion. This time around, his blueprint was the 1989 ABA Report on
the Commission. Steve Calkins, who became General Counsel at
the FTC under Bob, was counsel to the ABA committee, and much of
his effort involved negotiating what might modestly be called a Pitof-
28 405 U.S. 233 (1972) (holding that in order to protect consumers as well as competitors,
the F'rC may determine that challenged practices constitute unfair methods of competition or
unfair or deceptive acts or practices even though the practice violates neither the letter or spirit
of the antitrust laws). See also Substantiation Policy Statement, supra note 18.
29 See Letter from FTC to Hon. Wendell Ford and Hon. John Danforth, Committee on
Commerce, Science and Transportation (Dec. 17, 1980), reprinted in Int'l Harvester Co., 104
F.T.C. 1070, 1071 (1984) (delineating a "concrete framework for future application of the
Commission's unfairness authority"). See also Letter from FrC to Hon. Robert Packwood and
Hon. Robert Kasten (Mar. 5, 1982), reprinted in H.R. REP. No. 156, pt. 1, at 27, 32 (1983)
(also explaining the FrC's unfairness authority).
" See 15 U.S.C. § 45(n) (1994).
31 American Bar Association, Report of the American Bar Association Section of Antitrust
Law Special Committee to Study the Role of the Federal Trade Commission, 58 ANTITRUST L.J.
43 (1989).
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sky/Muris view of the FrC. Happily, our agreements were far more
significant than our disputes. Indeed, on consumer protection, differ-
ences were largely inconsequential. We agreed that the Commission
needed to assert national leadership more aggressively; focus on sig-
nificant cases, particularly fraud; work closely with the states; and
provide clearer guidance to industry.
Let me repeat what I said during my confirmation hearing:
[t]wenty years ago we shifted the Federal Trade Commis-
sion's emphasis away from cumbersome rulemaking de-
signed to transform entire industries toward aggressive law
enforcement of the basic rules that we already have-rules
against fraud, deception, and breach of contract. Our vision
was that the Federal Trade Commission would forge a bipar-
tisan consensus on how to protect consumers and would
work with other federal and state agencies to provide maxi-
mum benefits for consumers from the Federal Trade Com-
mission's limited resources. Today, through the hard work
of hundreds of people over the past 20 years and superb
leadership of the Commission-most recently by Bob Pitof-
sky and Jodie Bernstein-that dream has become reality.32
As Bob Pitofsky himself has often said, much of the praise for begin-
ning the skillful implementation of the recommendations in the 1989
ABA Report rightfully belongs to Janet Steiger, who chaired the FTC
from 1989 to 1995. Building on her work, Bob swiftly enlarged the
Commission's activity beyond traditional media to establish the FTC
as watchdog over fraud and deception in what has become a global
electronic marketplace. While the new medium was still in its in-
fancy, the Commission moved quickly to establish an intellectual
framework for applying well-settled consumer protection principles
online. It held a series of hearings on Consumer Protection in the
High-Tech Global Marketplace, which it used to craft a blueprint for
Commission action. With the overall goal of protecting consumers
without imposing unnecessary burdens on this emerging marketplace,
the plan called for aggressive law enforcement, especially against
fraud; consumer and industry education; and the development of poli-
cies in areas raising new consumer protection concerns, including
privacy.
The results have been impressive. The online law enforcement
program has:
32 See Timothy J. Muris, Statement Before the Committee on Commerce, Science and
Transportation, United States Senate, at http://commerce.senate.govlhearings/0516may.pdf
(May 16,2001).
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produced more than 200 cases challenging deceptive practices;
transformed the way the agency does business by pioneering the use
of the Internet as a law enforcement tool; training state, local, and
international consumer protection officials in online investigative
methods; and creating a global database to coordinate law enforce-
ment efforts; and has instituted "surf days" to locate patently decep-
tive promotions and organized "sweeps" on a global scale to shut
down fraudulent operators.
In addition to law enforcement, during Chairman Pitofsky's ten-
ure, the FTC moved aggressively to provide clear guidance to indus-
try that the same consumer protection standards apply online as apply
in the "brick-and-mortar" world. Through publications such as Ad-
vertising and Marketing on the Internet: The Rules of the Road33 and
Dot.Corn Disclosures,34 the FTC made its standards transparent. In
response to requests from advertisers for more informal guidance, the
Commission sponsored workshops such as E-tail Details, a one-day
seminar on consumer protection basics for cyber-retailers, and Dis-
closure Exposure, a national conference on disclosures in advertising
sponsored with the National Advertising Division of the Better Busi-
ness Bureau. I believe that the Commission's public workshops in
recent years have been immensely helpful to consumers and industry,
and I intend for the Commission to continue them.
In addition to applying well-settled consumer protection princi-
ples to the Internet, the Commission fostered dialogue among the in-
dustry, the public, and the government about developing areas of con-
sumer concern, including online privacy. During Chairman Pitof-
sky's tenure, the FTC held nine public workshops on privacy issues,
worked with industry to encourage self-regulatory efforts, conducted
two major surveys of websites' privacy practices, and issued a series
of Reports to Congress.
The approach the Commission has taken toward e-commerce is a
prominent example of the innovative leadership of the Pitofsky era,
but it is not the only one. Programs were created to address newly
emerging areas such as identity theft, predatory lending, and cross-
border fraud. In addition, the Commission undertook an extensive
regulatory review program that resulted in the repeal or revision of
33 BUREAU OF CONSUMER PROTECTION, FED. TRADE COMM'N, ADVERTISING AND MAR-
KETING ON THE INTERNET: THE RULES OF THE ROAD, at http://www.ftc.gov/
bcp/conline/pubs/buspubs/ruleroad.pdf (2000).
34 BUREAU OF CONSUMER PROTECTION, FED. TRADE COMM'N, DOT.COM DISCLOSURES:
INFORMATION ABOUT ONLINE ADVERTISING, at http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/conline/pubs/buspubs/
dotcomlindex.pdf (n.d.)
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dozens of its rules and guides, thereby reducing unnecessary burdens
on businesses. Across the board, the consumer protection program
was strengthened by stepping up the fight against fraud; increasing
cooperation with state law enforcers; focusing Commission resources
on the practices that pose risks to consumer health and safety, such as
deceptive health claims; and making consumer and business educa-
tion an integral part of law enforcement.
The Pitofsky Commission used Section 13(b) of the FTC Act to
bring more than 450 cases in federal court to fight bogus business
opportunities, investment scams, and other patently deceptive promo-
tions. Through these efforts, the Commission has obtained hundreds
of millions of dollars in redress for defrauded consumers, won orders
banning the most serious offenders from certain businesses, and
stepped up civil and criminal enforcement against recidivists and
scofflaws.
Not included in these impressive numbers are the hundreds of
additional cases brought since 1995 by state attorneys general as part
of more than 50 FTC co-sponsored "sweeps"-coordinated law en-
forcement actions in which multiple cases are filed simultaneously all
across the country against companies and individuals engaged in a
particular type of fraud.35 Concentrating federal and state resources
in this way to bring dozens of law enforcement actions at one time not
only sends an emphatic warning to others engaged in the same ques-
tionable promotions, but also dramatically raises consumer awareness
of that particular type of fraud.
Another hallmark of the Pitofsky era was the case selection poli-
cies that focused on areas that pose the greatest risk of consumer in-
jury, most notably misleading representations about health and safety.
For example, through Operation Cure.All, a multi-stage international
law enforcement sweep targeting products promising to treat cancer,
AIDS, and other serious conditions, the FTC sent a strong message
that deceptive health claims will not be tolerated.36
35 See, e.g., Marketing Scams: Hearing Before the Senate Subcommittee on Commerce,
Justice and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies, 105th Congress, 2nd Sess. 30 (1998)
(statement of Robert Pitofsky, Chairman, Federal Trade Commission) (outlining joint FrC-state
sweeps against deceptive prize promotions, bogus charities, investment and business opportu-
nity schemes, and "recovery" scams).
36 See, e.g., Press Release, FTC, Operation Cure.All Targets Internet Health Fraud (June
24, 1999), at http:llwww.ftc.gov/opa/1999/9906/04/opcureall.htm (announcing the FTC's
launch of "Operation Cure.AI" using law enforcement and consumer education campaign de-
signed to combat Internet health fraud); Press Release, FTC, FTC Hits Internet Health Fraud in
Continuation of Operation Cure.All (April 5, 2000), at www.ftc.gov/opa/2000/04/cure-a12.htm
(announcing settlements with internet companies and their principal officers following FTC
allegations that these companies made unsubstantiated claims regarding the effectiveness of
their medical treatments).
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In addition to fighting fraud in court, the Commission in recent
years has recognized that one of the best defenses against deceptive
practices is a well-informed consumer. During Bob's tenure, the FTC
became a national leader in consumer education, publishing more
than 200 titles distributed by federal, state, and local consumer pro-
tection offices and hundreds of private sector partners. Total annual
distribution of consumer education materials-including electronic
distribution on the Commission's award-winning websites-now
numbers over ten million. The consumer protection record of the last
six years under Pitofsky sets a high bar for future Commissions.
V. COMPETITION
I turn now to Bob's contributions to the Commission's competi-
tion mission. As described above, the 1969 ABA Report envisioned
an important antitrust role for the FTC. That role would not consist
of simply imitating the Department of Justice's Antitrust Division.
Instead, the Commission would use the comparative advantages of its
unique institutional traits to formulate national competition policy.
37
To the ABA Commission, the FTC could make distinctive con-
tributions by exploiting the "full panoply" of its institutional tools-
doing research, publishing studies, bringing cases, and solving prob-
lems at the intersection of its competition policy and consumer pro-
tection authority.38 In particular, the FTC could aid the formulation
of national competition policy by focusing its resources on "difficult
and complex antitrust questions., 39 The agency's special information
gathering and research capabilities would suggest the appropriate path
for doctrine, and the Commission could use administrative adjudica-
tion, guidelines, reports, and rules to shape policy.
For the most part, this vision did not become reality in the 1970s.
The Commission pursued a number of novel and ill-conceived anti-
trust initiatives. Perhaps the most visible FTC competition policy
initiatives of that decade were efforts to use the novel "shared mo-
37 The 1969 ABA Report called the FTC's past antitrust performance "less than satisfac-
tory" and mainly attributed its disappointing record to the agency's failure "to take advantage of
the unique strengths conferred upon it by Congress." ABA REPORT, supra note 1, at 64. The
ABA Report identified the Commission's "unique strengths" as: (1) broad investigatory powers;
(2) the centralization in one agency of commissioners, administrative law judges, attorneys, and
economists who collectively could develop special competence in the antitrust field; (3) the
ability to decide questions without necessarily relying on case-by-case precedent; and (4) the
power to issue studies to the Executive Branch, the Congress, and the public on antitrust issues.
l at 64-65.
38 See ABA REPORT, supra note 1, at 65.
'9 Id. at 64.
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nopoly" theory to deconcentrate the country's breakfast cereal"0 and
petroleum industries.41 These initiatives failed, and have no enduring
support. Bob had no direct responsibility for them, and has long since
disclaimed any support for their intellectual foundations. More posi-
tively, the 1970s also marked the start of the Commission's highly-
regarded program to enforce antitrust in the professions.42 The FTC's
efforts to address the "difficult and complex" competition issues in
the provision of health care and other professional services fulfilled
the vision of the 1969 ABA Report.
The 1980s were crucial for establishing the modem antitrust
mainstream. Although this is not the occasion to revisit that decade,
landmarks such as the retooling of the merger guidelines, a renewed
emphasis on horizontal restraints, and focus on efficiency in analyz-
ing joint ventures such as GM-Toyota-each step bitterly opposed at
the time-have become accepted parts of the bipartisan antitrust
agenda of recent years.
Economics has a crucial role in informing the FTC's judgment
about how best to carry out its mission. Modem discussion about
developments in industrial organization economics often focuses on
putting economic ideas into allegedly neat "Chicago" and "Post-
Chicago" compartments. This is a sterile exercise. Regarding anti-
trust, we must have solid economic analysis that is firmly grounded in
facts and real world institutions. These traits characterize what might
simply be called good economics, rather than economics of any
"school." Although I have not always agreed with cases brought by
the Pitofsky FTC, Commission departures from relying on good eco-
nomics were exceptions, not the norm.
Although there are disagreements about cases at the margin,
there is widespread agreement that the purpose of antitrust is to pro-
tect consumers, that economic analysis should guide case selection,
and that horizontal cases, both mergers and agreements among com-
petitors, are the mainstays of antitrust. Moreover, today there is bi-
partisan recognition that antitrust law is a way of helping to organize
our economy. A freely functioning market, subject to the rules of
antitrust, provides maximum benefits to consumers.
40 See Kellogg Co., FTC No. 8883 (Apr. 26, 1972), complaint dismissed, 99 F.T.C. 280
(1982).
41 See Exxon Corp., FTC No. 8934 (July 18, 1973), complaint dismissed, 98 F.T.C. 453
(1981).
42 The FrC's most notable accomplishment of this period was its successful challenge to
various restrictions on advertising by physicians imposed by the American Medical Association.
See e.g., Am. Med. Ass'n, 94 F.T.C. 701 (1979) (final admin. order), affid and modified, Am.
Med. Ass'n, 638 F.2d 443 (2nd Cir. 1980), affid by an equally divided Court, 455 U.S. 676
(1982).
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In returning to the Commission as Chairman in the 1990s, Bob
Pitofsky was especially well-suited to design an agenda for executing
the ABA Report's vision of the FTC's competition policy mission.
Pitofsky brought to the task an extraordinary reservoir of personal
intellectual capital concerning antitrust competition policy and anti-
trust enforcement in the United States. I already have mentioned
Bob's previous experience as an FTC Bureau Director and as a
Commissioner. He was also one of our leading antitrust scholars,
having authored important works on such matters as distribution prac-
tices, 43 efficiencies,44 joint ventures,45 mergers,46 and the goals of the
antitrust laws.47 He already had transmitted much of this learning to
the competition policy community in one of the country's most influ-
ential antitrust casebooks48 and in his participation in special, blue-
ribbon panels dealing with difficult antitrust questions, such as the
consolidation of the defense industry.49
In several key areas, the Pitofsky FTC looked beyond litigation
alone and expanded reliance on the "full panoply" of competition pol-
icy tools at its disposal, thus following the ABA panel's view that the
maintenance of two antitrust agencies required complementary roles.
From the beginning of his chairmanship, Bob restored the agency's
role in using fact-finding hearings and workshops to identify the ap-
propriate path of future policies and to formulate a law enforcement
and advocacy agenda. The agency's hearings on globalization and
innovation, collaboration among competitors, and B2B ventures pro-
vided valuable examples of how the FTC could use its distinctive ca-
43 See, e.g., Robert Pitofsky, In Defense of Discounters: The No-Frills Case for a Per Se
Rule Against Vertical Price Fixing, 71 GEO. L.J. 1487, 1487 (1983) (arguing that minimum
vertical price-fixing agreements lead to higher and uniform resale prices).
44 See, e.g., Robert Pitofsky, Proposals for Revised United States Merger Enforcement in
a Global Economy, 81 GEo. LJ. 195 (1992) (arguing for more restrictive enforcement against
vertical and horizontal mergers and narrowly-focused enforcement against conglomerate merg-
ers).
45 See, e.g., Robert Pitofsky, Joint Ventures Under the Antitrust Laws: Some Reflections
on the Significance of Penn-Olin, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1007 (1969) (noting that antitrust doctrine
has not successfully checked the rising tide of anti-competitive joint ventures).
4 See, e.g., Robert Pitofsky, New Definitions of the Relevant Market and the Assault on
Antitrust, 90 COLUM. L. REv. 1805 (1990) (suggesting an alternative approach to market defini-
tion).
47 See, e.g., Robert Pitofsky, The Political Content of Antitrust, 127 U. PAL. REv. 1051
(1979) (arguing for inclusion of specific, non-economic goals in antitrust analysis).
48 See MILTON HANDLER Er AL., TRADE REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS (4th ed.
1997).
49 See DEF. SCL BD., REPORT OF THE DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD TASK FORCE ON ANTI-
TRUST ASPECTS OF THE DEFENSE INDUSTRY CONSOLIDATION (1994) (chaired by Robert Pitof-
sky).
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pabilities to communicate with and to the business community and
develop a consensus about the future course of policy.
50
The menu of competition policy activities during the Pitofsky era
in the 1990s also included studies and guidelines. The FTC's hear-
ings helped shape guidelines that the Commission and the Justice De-
partment issued on competitor collaboration and efficiencies. 51 The
Commission devoted special attention to studying the effects of past
remedies in merger cases and prepared a report that has fostered valu-
able debate inside the FTC and within the larger antitrust community
about the appropriate design of remedies.52 The Pitofsky Commission
used the FTC's historically important research and reporting capabili-
ties to shape policy. Future Commissions will no doubt continue to
use these unique FTC capabilities.
The ABA Report recommended that the Commission make spe-
cial contributions to elaborating antitrust doctrine through administra-
tive adjudication. During Bob's chairmanship, the Commission
worked aggressively to improve the administrative process. Key re-
forms included the adoption of a "fast track" administrative litigation
option and a commitment by the Commission itself to accelerate the
preparation of opinions. These and related initiatives were evident in
cases such as Toys "R" Us, Inc. v. FTC53 and In re Summit Technol-
ogy, Inc.54 These reforms reflected awareness of a key path for future
development-that the enhancement of the Commission's administra-
tive process could significantly improve the capacity of the U.S. anti-
trust system to shape antitrust doctrine during rapid technological
change. Of course, the unprecedented merger wave of the 1990s pre-
vented the agency from fully articulating a non-merger agenda. Be-
fore 1970, this agenda was principally Robinson-Patman Act cases.
One of Bob's major achievements, both in the ABA report and else-
5O See BUREAU OF CONSUMER PROTECTION, FED. TRADE COMM'N, PUBLIC WORKSHOP
ON CONSUMER PRIVACY ON THE GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE (1996); FED. TRADE
COMM'N, ANTICIPATING THE 21 r CENTURY: COMPETITION POLICY IN THE NEW HIGH-TECH
GLOBAL MARKETPLACE (1996); FED. TRADE COMM'N, ENTERING THE 21sT CENTURY: COMPE-
TITION POLICY IN THE WORLD OF B2B ELECTRONIC MARKETPLACES (2000).
51 See DEP'T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM'N, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES
(rev. ed. 1997); FED. TRADE COMM'N & DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR COL-
LABORATIONS AMONG COMPETITORS (2000). Although I have criticized parts of this effort,
particularly the agencies' handling of this issue in court cases, the guidelines themselves were a
substantial improvement over previous versions. See Timothy J. Muris, The Government and
Merger Efficiencies: Still Hostile After All These Years, 7 GEO. MASON L. REV. 729, 731-733
(1999) (describing the newer merger guidelines as beneficial and reflective of a more enlight-
ened government policy on mergers).
52 See BUREAU OF COMPETITION, FED. TRADE COMM'N, A STUDY OF THE COMMISSION'S
DIVESTITURE PROCESS (1999).
53 221 F.3d 928 (7th Cir. 2000).
-5 FTC Dkt. No. 9286 (Mar. 5, 1999) (decision and order), at http:/www.ftc.gov/
os/1999/9903/dO9286summit.do.htm.
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where,55 was as a leader in documenting the anti-consumer nature of
many of the FrC's Robinson-Patman cases.
As Chairman, Bob continued one of the FrC's major post-1970
efforts to develop a non-merger agenda by continuing aggressive en-
forcement against anti-competitive practices in the professions. He
also did much more. The FTC's allocation of law enforcement re-
sources during Bob's chairmanship demonstrated a commitment, as
the ABA 1969 Report had proposed, to focus the Commission's atten-
tion on "difficult and complex" areas of antitrust law. The agenda of
prominent examples include tough questions involving merger pol-
icy,56 single-firm exclusionary conduct,57 and remedies.
58
No field of law better demonstrates the Pitofsky Commission's
willingness to engage difficult and complex matters than the relation-
ship between antitrust doctrine and intellectual property.59 In these
and other areas, the Commission confronted special challenges posed
by innovation competition, e-commerce, globalization, and rapid
technological change. Although I have disagreed with some of the
Pitofsky Commission's initiatives here,60 we agree that the potential
for anticompetitive abuse of intellectual property is an increasingly
important area. While recognizing the necessity of protecting valid
intellectual property rights, future Commissions will no doubt remain
active.
CONCLUSION
My deep appreciation for Robert Pitofsky's achievements should
be clear. I only hope that I can approach the mark that he has set for
us all.
55 See ABA REPORT, supra note 1, at 67. See, e.g., Boise Cascade Corp., 107 F.T.C. 76,
79-85 (1986) (dissenting statement of Commissioner Robert Pitofsky on issuance of the com-
plaint).
56 See, e.g., FTC v. Staples, Inc., 970 F. Supp. 1066 (D.D.C. 1997).
5 See e.g., Intel Corp., FTC Dkt. No. 9288, 1999 F.T.C. Lexis 145, at *1 (Aug. 3, 1999)
(decision and order).
58 See e.g, FTC v. Mylan Labs. Inc., No. 1:98CV03114 (TFH) (D.D.C. Feb. 9, 2001)
(order and stipulated permanent injunction), at http:lwww.ftc.gov/os/2000/1 l/mylanordan-
stip.htm.
59 See Robert Pitofsky, Antitrust and Intellectual Property: Unresolved Issues at the Heart
of the New Economy, Address Before the Berkeley Center for Law and Technology at the Uni-
versity of California, Berkeley (March 2, 2001), at www.ftc.gov/speeches/pitofskyipf3Ol.htm.
60 See Timothy J. Muris, The FTC and the Law of Monopolization, 67 ANTrrRUST L.J.
693, 694 (2000) (criticizing a trend in FTC cases suggesting that the government need not show
proof of anticompetitive effect in monopolization cases).

